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PREFACE
In this short study I have attempted to place bureaucracies and
bureaucratic operations in their proper context in our
My

systan

o£ goveHnnent.

emphasis is upon the political nature of both bureeuoraeies and their

operations.

are not

The•

natters whiQh 81"e well understood by the vast
By nature the topic is 10mewhat broader than

majority ot our citizens.

I woul.d have preferred it to be, bat use.tul knowledge has both breadth and

depth

dimanaiona,

and the student as ....U as the practiti oner � public

administrat.ion baa need far both.
Debts are owed to the author• listed in the selected bibliograpey,

as well a8 to maiv others not listed for sharpening my perceptions of marzy"
aspects of W?"eau.oreciea• which I first l.earned by experience , during thirty'
years of sarvieo in the

u.s.

Marine Corps, both aa a "bureaucrat• and as a

subject o! bureaucratic operationa-military a1'¥1 civilian alike.
I wish to express

nur

since.rest thanks to each

member of the Political

Science Department ot Eastern Illinoi s University for the unsparing time
and effort that

be

has given to th1e student on each occasion that advice

or help \award a better umerstanding of subject matter
oour•

th91 are all

stuey, which

are

oonpl.etely

exone rated

all mine alone.

was

needed.

or

fJ'm cry ahortcanings 1n this

It I have not learned, it is

not because

the s ubject matter vu not.well taught in the f'irst pl.ace.
To Doctor Joeeph T. ConnelJ.7, my adviser far graduate study• I owe a
special debt of gratitude

rcr

his J>8tiance , understanding and tactful

suggestion& during Tf'iY entire course of stu<\v.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to examine the charges that

go"'91"!Dent bul-eaucracy 1s a serious threat to
ot government, particularly

to our syst.:i

constitutional sy-stan

our

of checks S1d balances, the

provisions tor the separation 0£ powers and the theories
and responsible goTernman't.

'Which have been

made

they include the
expressed as

are

by

no

means

all

representative

of the charges

against bureaucracy and bureaucratsJ but1 certainly,

more

11the

These

ot

serious ones.

Most

nly, the charges are

CC\1111110

bureaucrats are taking over the gowrnnent,11 or

"the

President• himselt, is all rightJ but it is that crowd around him that
bothers me."

In

each case :reference was

C.ing made to persons

apparently have a lot to do and say about the
even though they

are

way

not elected to a position

heard the above complaints since he has been

1n

old

who

our government is run,
Host of us have

it.

enough to remember.

It

is suggested that they ar e as o1d as our govet'ment itsel.t.
The prineipal reason !or undertaking this stud'$'

is to attanpt

some

synthesis ot the course work• independent study and practical experience,
which

this writel9 has had v.1.th bureaucraaiea,

what he

should have 1eamed from

that this study will

provide

to test his

those sources.

Secondly, it is hoped

a satisfactory overview of both the

adllinistrative process and bureaucratic operations to
of some of our citizens

who

Wlde.rstanding of

allay

the fears

might really believe that the bureaucrats
1

2

are taking over our government.

Lastly, of the some seven commonly accepted

aspects or public administration, that one concerning the po11t1cs of
administration is the one with which political scientists shou1d be most

One can become a good administrator without having studied

concerned.

political
abo ut
o£

science, but not without learning that public administration is

equal parts

of politics and administration.

An

early unlerstanding

this b•aic .taet will he� students and practitioners all.ke.
The scope or

t.his study

is limited, primarily, to policy

making

am pol.1ey implementation at the leNel of Congressional committee•
admillistl°ati'ftl

agency, federal court of appeals and interest group level.

'While broad general policy is still made, endorsed or unmade at the
highest level of tJ1e President, the Congress and the Supreme Court, the
operating policies with which the public is most concerned are made or

not made at the lower level.

Concentration will be on the delegation of

powers to agencies for rule-cnaldng, rule-application and adjudication,
t.ogether 'With the Political consequence s vhich follow.

Attention will be

focused on the poll
tical aspects of bureaucratic operations, vhich tend
to keep th• in consonance Wi.th

our

normative concepts ot constitutional.

All discussion of bureaucracies and bureaucratic operations

government.

in this stldy is limited to the bureaucracy of the

exec utive

branch of

our government.
For

t he purpose of this study it w1ll be su:f'ficient to define

the bureaucracy of the executiv"Et branch as the totality of groups of
non-electiw

government

otticials characterised by specialization �

functions, adherence to 1'1x8d rules and a hierarchy of authority, engaged
in the administration ot public policy arv:l/or law within limits and in

3

acco�ance with standards set by Congress.
branch is not a monolithic organisation.

The bureauc:r"7 of the ex.ecuti:ve

It is

composed

of many and

diverse unite each with a particular tuncitie>n to per.tO!ill.

The

on.ly

teature that they all have in common is that they are all organised
bureaucratically.

The

bureaucracies are composed of political

and career pereonnal who man the F.ixecutive office

twelve
the

e:mcut1ft

8099

Not all
as

departmenta,

thiriq independent

employees

not) al¥i

ot the President, the

the nine !ndepsident regulatory commissions,

agencies and the seVeral gov8l"unent

to the

.men

in the

political appointees (whether

tor set

top grades of the career service who

have a considerable degree of discretion concerning
and how

corporations.

The tem "bureaucrat•

in a burencracy are "bur•ucr!l'ts."

used in this study re.fers to all

tems or

appointees

what

is to be

it ia to be done in oon.nsetion with the functions of

done

tbeil'

organisurbions.
The approach and methodology are this wrl.ter•s

systems appl"'Oach
See"lllS

with

its inputs, outputs, feedbacks

and

The

blends.

continuous cycling

most appropriate fo:r this study• and it is used fo� the pr:i.noipal

orientation.

However• tbe group theory approach. the distributiw approach

and the functional epproaoh have aome
deal

own

appl.1catin.
o

witi'l interest groupa tor th• most

pan;

Govunaental

and allCh groups are

sub-syst.s
particularly

interested in the d18trib'1\1on of benefits and coata inc:l.dent to the
functions of rule-cnaldng, rule-application and adj '1Ciicat1on• tllhich together
with policy initiation .torm the ehiet function9 ot a goTe.rmellbal agency.

The methodology is chiefly mpiri.eal deeoriptift/elfplaMtory with

reliance

tlpO%l primary and

aecondary souroea.

For original

pri.ncipal

&Gu.roee,

�

writer ia

in

dependent

m1lital'1

upon

his

axperia:1Ce•

bureauc�ee cnv

a thi"1

•s an obser'lel"/participant of and

year ap8rl ot militar,r eerv.tce.

That axparlmee also 1ncluded dealing with gc,9Gr11nental bul'8aucracd.es at
the national.., stne and local 1ema,

as well • •

vi.th _.. bureaUCl"ae1.es

in .foreign countriea.
Three

st�.

The

axpe19DM.

bypot.he8"

tvt>ot-huee

and a thffie

been f'o:rmul.ated to guide t:tie

have been derived !':ma a cmbiMtion of

Since th• ere pr1llaril7

e.f'torie will be ude to dispJll'OYe

moat

hne

and

axpresaiona of ru.u.a, no particular

or wr1fy

th••

bur.aucnte would pnerdl.1' apiee With them.

•• fol..l.t
.ove

study

It

is

The

.ugg�

that.

h1Pothe- are

l. Bureaucratic officiala ha- goals the eae as the
rest of us. Those goals usually include professional competence,
excellent perfOJ'mClCle• advancement,. power, pr•sttge, iafluezlC*,
security and-loyalty to the nation and to pa?'ticular ideas• such
ae dmoeraey, reasonable opport.wu.ty, rea.nable equality, and
social just1ce.
Hare than most of ws, they usually have a

genuine de31re and responsibility to seJ'ft_, protect and promote
the general interest to the eictent that they can identity it in
the course or their 1t0rk.
Bureaucrats seek to achieve their goals and those of
t.hair organization 1n a rational man:MJ.'. They have to be utility
muimizers 1n that � must act in the most efficient manner
possLble, given their capabilities in the particular arees Within
Which they must operate am the coats in Mme, effort. and JDONV'
in aecu:ring reliable information upon whieh to .ct arnd to gen8Fate
the required euppon tor thea pl.ans, progieane and operations
2.

•

.3. The so-cal.led bureaucratic inertia is not so much a
problem of a lack ot ideas and p-lans and the willingness to push
them, as it is a problan ot mullteri.ng sufficient agreement and
support .tran diverse and otten warr:i ng sources to get these ideas
and pl.ans adopted and impl.amented. Aa a consequence progress by
b ureal&Crati.c organiutiona ie most eommon1y made in Sllall inoreents,
rather than by bold movu. Bureaucracies in a nav and important
tield (NASA) or bureaucracies umler orlais conditions (national
anergency or war) can operate in a bold, broad and aggressive manna?'1
simply b eca use agreement and adequate su.pport are torthooming
wxlel' such cirewstancea.

The prl.Mipll t.hesis for this

study is that ewointed political.

executi-re• mid iq> pad.a car•r men who head the vario\ls bureaucracies of
the

exec

uti.._ bNuch of our government do in .fact run

our

eoverrnent with

respect to botb poli.07 formulation and policy impl.ementation. Th..i.s. thesis

is not t-o -..n

'Mlat the bureal.l�ata reign $UpretMlJ.1

not aubjen to ebMlcs am balances by eleatod
It doe•

....-, that

tecter&l agene.1.ea, w.hich

nor

that 'bbey

are

ofti� and the courte.

are

essentially bueaucratic

org� du.1pwi to deal t.horoughl.T and rationallJr with giwn
pmblesq_. Jilva -.....

this thes:laa

an

integral part

of GU' go�.

the diacusaioa which foll.owe will

gave r1H '-· ttUI naed tor emcpanded activ:i:t;y

go�

iJm>l"fed.•

on

In euwort of

outline the .tactore 'llhioh
the

pUt

or the tederal

the \ools sel.Mted to deal with the many and varied

pt"Obl••

the prooe asu for dealing with them cid ilhe ilrplioaticme ot

the results tow our � of constitutional delocracy.

BIG GOVERNMENT

I.

Last Days of taisses-Faire
'l'he dominant political ideology 1n this country from the founding
of the Republic down to the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929

1

was that of laissez-f'aire.

The laissez-f'aire tradition

was

part of our

heritage trom the Whig party of' Great Britain, which championed .tl'eedom
from interf erenee by- govermrent into personal. attairs, particularly into
social and economic matters.

government

In short la1sen-.f'a1re meant treed.om f':rom

and not .treedom under gover11nent.

Be.vord. the maintenance o�

reasonable national security and domestic t.ranquill1t:r and the protection
ot lite, liberty and property, nothing more in the way or interference
was desired fl-om go'\'e?'nment.
individualism

Unrestricted t.ree enterprise and rugged

were the cherished values included in the freedom to do as

one pleased, so long as the reasonable rights of others were not violated
or abused in too f".l.agrant a manner.
peo�e seened to want and that

Limited go"ternment was 'What the

was what

they recei ved.

or

course it vas

eorud.dared perfectly rlght and proper for limited govermnent to pro1'10te the
values of the people by creating opportunities and providing subsidies.
This was done.
resources

were

There

was

free

or cheap land on the expanding frontier,

thrown open for exploitation and taritts were pxoovided to

protect home industries.

So long as these conditions could ba maintained,

1see
Mifflin

John K. Galbraith, American Capitalisn (Bost.one
Co., 1952). First half of the book.
·

6

Houghton

7

the J.a�.U. l*l.ogy seemed to work quite

well.. How ev•-

the rapid

1nduatriali11at:l.Oll and U"'banisat.ion of AHrica folloving the Civil War

brought aDotat • ohallg-1 situation.
The llAW-1.

C91Mtequences o! the operation of that ideology were

well delomrWated in AJHrS,ca in the 1890•s.

By that tiDle the frontier vaa

closed• the reilZoad.a had been built, national. marketa bad been developed
am the

�

monopolt1tld

co•ooi.4 and indalstrial

bJ' a tw .giants.

enterprises

'.l'he corporations

bad

had � largely

laJ'gely replaced

personal ....nbip lad opsration and � larger catbina'biona �
corporatioM

in the tol'll of

triusta

had been .., reeom"Cea luKi been

the stage had beeJ1

eet

ware

veil under ,,..,.•

plundered, labor had

for the ttmuckrakers."

of the 1870'1 vith hia,

Great fortunes
been aploited

and

Mak Twain caught the spirit

!!:! Gilded � (1873) and

Lincoln Stettens

the spirit at the tll1'ft oi' the centui-y vith hie, ,!h! Shane

2!

caught

thflt Cities.

GoveJ:flll8nt had reacted rather weekly with the Interstate Commerce eo.ission.
to regulate the plwxlering of the tamers by the rail.roads and with the

Shennan Anti 'mat Aot to slow down the

trends toward more

monopolies in bua:lneea, industry aDi finance.

am bigger

No real successes could be

claimed in either area.
The ProgreSBive El-a
The beginning of the

end

of laissez-faire political ideology in

America Tllight well be dated from the beginnings of the Progressive
movement in A-meriean polities.

considerably more conservative

The Progressive movement (l9o&.1917) was
than

the Populist movement which it

8

ves pushed eonie

the Progress!

followed,, eTen though

better

id.918.2

The Progres&i.ves

sav

dangers

on

the Populists'

of

both

the right and left.

On the 1'lght there waa the t.hreat of the lose of freedom and
to the �

COJ.i><>rate

institutions.

On the 1&.f't. was the threat

power in the economy md its effect.a on social

of the loss of the seme

from mob �e, or at b&st some type of aoatal.:1sm.

'l'bey

more moderate.

va1uee

The Progressives were

v.1.ehed to preseM'e the syst.an while ridding it of the

veret a'buae• which had been made of

his

individualism

it.

Presiclent Theodore Rooaevel.t,

with

Square Dql,1 attempted to reverse the trend toward increasing oorporate

power by using sueh

means .a

he had at han:l in t.he way of 1awa end a

popularised presideney to curb more monopolistic growth and to do some
"trust busting"

among

Roosevelt did oot
monopolistic
happened to

social

those

obj ect

character

be

big.

values as

monopolies

which had grown too large.

to Bise alone.

What he did obj ect to was the

o! some corporations, which just naturally

His main object!ve was to

well as

political values

Unf'ortunately, Roosevelt• s

in

incorporate ecooornie

government. 3

good beg1.nn1ng toward

continued by President 'Wllllam H. Ta.ft, who fell
the rt()].d Guard''
w:i

Republicans. They could

th the way th e govermen"t

alike since the Civil War.

had been

run

see

back

nothing

reform

2Ricbard Ho!stadta,
Books, 1948),

3John Morton

Press , 1968),

P• xi.

P•

particularly wrong

by Republicans and the Democrats

The ri.tt in the Republican party

The

199-;-

was not

into the arms ot

Progressives and the "01d Guard" allowed Woodrow Wilson to

Vintage

and

American Political

between the

capture the

Tradition

Blum, la! Regubli�aft &geevelt (Mev Yorkt

(New

York:

Atheneum

9

Wilson• while a Democrat, was imbued with the

1912.

presidency in

was different.
Roosevel.t had

took up

He

progressive spirit.

Instead
done,

to

0£

produce needed

of t he Federal Reserve Board,
Anti

passed by Congress

His sty.La

using the pres:ld81C7 a s • "bully pulpit," as

legislati vo action by Congress.
of the Clayton

her e Roosevelt had left orr.

w

he

sought reform through

Such action resulted in the establ18hment

the

Truat Act.

refonn-

Federal Trade Commission and t.he passa ge

Tvo amendments to the Constitution

and ratified by the states during Wilson' s

were

tenure.

His

legislative skills created the image of the President as chiof legislator.4
However• America's entrance into World War I in 1917 halted

more

P10ves

by

the government into the social an1 econonic fields and farther tJWl.f'J from
laissez-faire ideology.

Return

to

Nornalcy

With the

em

of World War I and the election of

President

Warren G.

IIa.'"Ciing (the first beneficiary of the last progressive reform-the
vote ) the country

settled i tsel.f back for what

"return to nonnalcy. •

Pre sident

Progressivisn seemed to

1924, Robert

have

:�. LaFollette

been forgotten also.

's

Harding called a

Further reform or stricter enf'orcement

of business and industrial interests seemed t.o be all

women

but

of regulation

forgotten.

In the election of

received only about 4 million votes and Calvin

Coo lidee receivod r�ore votes than the other tl«> carilidates put together. S

�n

Nao:millan eo.,

York:

�l

w.w.

c.

Hargrove, Presidential Leaderehi,e (New York:
P• 53.

1966),

�\ �

Noggl.e,

Norton a

�,

The

Oil� Politic• !tl !l.!! 1920•s (Uew

me:; l�,

P•

170:

10
The promotion, rather than t..rie regulation of business seSTied to be the
chief noliey or bot.h Harding and Coolidge, with Herbert Hoover as Secretary
of Cetrmeroe.
people.

Prosperity returned in 1922 tor

The tanMra, miners and

but not for all of the

some

industrial workers were not part of

F. Scott Fitsgerald'• •Jan Age."

The idea that government should enter

actively into aooial and economic fields as it had done in the Progressive
era probably never occurred to either Harding or Coolidge.

Coolidge•e main

phil.oaop}\y of goverrnent vas cpressed in his statelrient that the main
business of goverment vas bu:siness.

This philosophy seams to haVe been

accepted by Hoover when he became president in

1929.

The DepreBalon

A.tter the stock market crash in the ran �

1929

had

ushered in the

Greet Depreaaion, Prestdcit Hoover still thought that the way out ltrY in

extelXling help to
let the

buaineee

pro8.P8l'it.f't

interests through goverment loans md to

vhiah wu

fllq>8Cted

For thi• J>'D'P011• and to foreatall

an

to foll.Olf, flow down to the people.

avalanche of bankruptcies, the

Reconstruction Finanoe Corporation was created.6

This was not enough,

it waa 110re than _, pnni.oua President had done in a depression.

but

Azq idea

that the federal gO'Yermtent ahould do anything direc'fay !or the people Who

might i'ind tbemselvu dest.itute and in dire need was no part of Hoover•s
philoaophy of gowrment.7

to persuade him

otherw:t.a.

6ttofatadter1

l!!!

Apparently his business men's cabinet did little
Perhaps they vere all of the sane m:tm

Aluerican P9litical Tra,<lition� P•

7Hargrove, Presidential Lcadersh:l.2, PP•

ll4-15.

.303.

on

the

ll

Hoover's

Mr.

subject.

He had been orphaned

at

an

oarl,y age, reared by

ho did well and then he

t'lhere

had

story had been sti'ictl.7 Horati o Alger material.

life

retired

at

early age

an

had

of Belgiwn (1914), :?cod

Administrator for the

Commission for

u.s. (1917-18)

ot tho American Relief Admtnistration for Europe (1919) •
been Secretary

private

0£ Co:>.merce, as previously mentioned.

in political

matters were in

Richard

dominant Aaerican tradition."

8

He

situation during the depression,
people

it was

means to
cane

as

get

a

perfectly

money

to

result of a

to a lack of

clear.

goods

Hofstadter's words "All

alt.11ough to the
They

smp]¥

had

th.at they

of complex

and services

the "Crisis of American

numbers or

Americans had

for than

t.o eo and nothing

had made

thal

that the

great

needed oost.

country

For

9

Ibid., PP•

do.

all

boiled down

willingnass

was capable

to

of

the first time great

Industrialization and urbanization

more than just themselves.

American Political

283-.3J1.

The depression

the Hoover Administration

dependent upon each other and, more espec1.al.ly, upon

8nofstadter, !h!

w the

hardships and there was no place

for thera to

depement upon

laissez-.faire

no ooney nor any honest

faotora, but they

Individuallam.n9

f aced

in

great majority o£ the

producing. Richard Hofstadter has well daocribed
as

Ho had also

His beliefs

effective demarA.--990ple with mney and the

spend it for the

the Relid

apparent]¥ neYW did grasp the econanie

buy tho things

number

He

and Chairman

individualism and substantial

enterprise, efficiency•

t.o school

tor government service.

c�airmanship o! the

.

sent

most successful engineer.

offered himselt

and

This service had i n c:' uded the

becorne a

relatives,

They had

beoo1ne

government for a Vll3'

Tradition, P• 286.

12
out

ot their

troubles.

When state

and local

gove:rx:warts did

to help thela, th ei� attention focused on the fed�al

not seem ab1e

go'V8l'llll911t.

Positive Govermerl.t.
New Deal an:l World War
On March

II

4, 19.33 President Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated positive

government 1n the u.s. in

his inaugtn"al address.

His

view was that it

was

the chief' function of government to do .for the peopJ.e those things whioh
they could not do for thanselves.

He nooded. Congress with bills during

the f'irst "100 days" calling tor emergency powers for the President and
the creation

of

the necessary administrati"'le

10

back on its feet,.

create

"Wt>rk

machinery to

His main objective wae to

use

get the

country

government spending to

and purchasing power for the general population.

The New Deal

for the "forgotten man" may r.ot have been an unqualified suc cess, as IDat\1
have c1aimed.J but the people 'Who

enough to
well.

rememb e r

came through the Depression and were ol.d

the conditions which existed then learned one lesaon

The powers of the

federal

governme nt could be used to advantage

to restore confidence in our political,

social

and ecollOOlic institutiorut,

to ease the ef.fects of economic crisis and to promote the general welfare
of the people.
Be.f'ore the results or the New Deal could be appraised objectiveJ.y,
var broke out in Europe (September 1939).

'!he production or war goods for

tbe All1 ea and our own belated defense preparations tended t.o take up sane

of the renteining slack in the econcny.

tAro

Pearl Harbor ended the Nell

Deal'•

'l908t stubborn probl8Dla.-tmampl.oyment and excess agricultural and

H.J.:

10Chmes E. Jacob,
Prentice-Hall Inc. ,

Leadershl;i

i967J,

PP•

f: tee
2.

....

Mew

R!al

(Englewood Cliffs,

l3
1ndUBtrial productive capacities.
on

L'ven before the

war put the

economy

a f�J'JMllt tull.production basis, one sign.1.:ficant factor

already bees1 noticed.

Government spend:!ng, ot all

the ranedies trl.ed,

..-ed to have the llCMJt desired eftecta on the economy.

charges o£ groaa vute made. during the ca:apa:ign
took pia. 1n
agai.n.

When some

waa noted, Rooaeve.lt cut govemment spending 1n 1937,

improvaunt

1938.

had

ot 1936,

and

a

fol.loving

downturn

A8 aoon as spending was reaumed the econcm.y turned up

'Die leeeona ot

the New

Deal were not f'orgottm

during the war.

11

While the WC' was s1Ail.1. in progress various measures were considered

to avoid

the

recesalon wh1eh

in

the past

liot

The problem vaa a ntajOJ' Oil$•

� would jobs have

the majority of � 12 million men

for n10st et

well.

those -.ployed in

bad tEllded to follow wars.

ard

eturning

women r

war industries

'l'he Full � Act of

1946

was the

work and dutroua of the

other

social legislation

aoci.al field to stay.

effect

run

opportunity

put

in existence

tM federal

In

so.

tha

surprising,

war and

to continue

to

in

It

final result.

governnaent into

This is not

the economy during

was already

the

to be found aa
effect

government to

E111Splo31t1en for all ot

to do

fowxi for

from service, jobs

vould have

declared that it would be the reeponsibil1ty of
foster or to create co!¥lit.iorls ot f\111

to be

those

able

to

effect that act plus

the econ<XJzy'

and

into

the

since the government had in

the machinery (the bureaucracies)

do

so

with

scne modi.tications.

Cold War
Since the war, the eeonany has been modified frcin
econoay to our present

�ofstadter,

form

The

of

a

war-capitalist

"democratic capitalism" which

American Political Tradition,

PP•

in

short means

,3Lo..JU..

adapting the economy to the greatest benefit o.f all i n support or the

philosophy ot the •ltare
production has not beerl
c a88s

ertate.

GoV91'1'1IHl'lt owncr8hip

oonsidered

at all

neces�,

or

14
new

the means ot

except 1n special

(TVA Atoroic Ezwrogy, etc.) Where only the government.

can

supply the

resourcaa. assuu the rJ.*8 and detemine the overall pollt1cal1 90Cial.

econoad.o

and

objMtivea

government owned plmt.e

to be
a1d

obtained.

productive

The great bulk of formel'ly

mNnS have pa s sed into

�l'nmmt part.icipdian in the economy

90

private hands

far since World War

.

II has been

limited to tiaoal. pol.Ur', unagement of the moiw;y supply am the
�� ot pnbllo peU.ey gt11delines and objectiYes.
to be

988Jl

the

Korean

CGIRitroenta.

aa

The

preeen:t,

rather high rate or

the neeNN17 MA9Ul"9•, but

to whethal'

on

a semi-war .tooting

centllot, � Vietnaw war and other international

unemployment

incre asing inn•td.on eould requiN et.ronger meuuree.

provided

remains

it this Ulld.ted parlieipation is sutticient in view or the .tact

�t the international Iituation hae kept the 8COl'kJll'l1'
w:l.t.h

It still

ctr

8l'Vl t.he

OUr experience

it ie largely • political.

hae

question

not they may be used.
SllJllHl"Y

This ra ther lengthy sketch of the origins of our present big
government is necessary to understand the caapl.ete change

in

ideology Which occurred in this country in the years between

This has

been the

193.3

end

1946.

most significant change in democratic ideology in the

twentieth century; and in the

aignifioant change in
the

political.

our

ease

1'istory.

eame change, whether the

new

of

the

u.s•• it is

perhaps the most

Otha dGnOCratic nations have experienced

819tan of bl.g government fosters democratic

capitalisn as in
Great Britain.

this country,

big goverunent to handle

tJt 1'l'lOde?'n 1n:ittstrial1��

c1tiun lllUft

stop

not been

the go� hae not 15howri either a direct

or

Government be cea894 to be either limited or

the reelll.t of f'otnt

that

principal

the manifold and complex

and tll"banised societies.

to think ot the remaining areas

It is fail' to a.:r

restrici#ed to

Authorltarian and totali tarlan syster.ts haw

democratic countries alone.

problems

a form of democratic social.is:i as in

big governmant has

The advent o!

likewise :toWld a need tor

or

ilhe rise of

factors.

in his

11.f'e in which

an indirect interest.

si..1!p].e.

rt

big govel'l'Jment

F11'st, was the

Second, was the need for

is big am

12

complex.

in America bas been

necessity

powers of �ent to deal Vith the social and econooii c
Depression.

In America, a

t.o use

prob:t.ans

the all-out sf'fort to Vin

the

of the

World

War II.

Third, was the need s tor reconversion ald to prov.:l.de the machinery tor the
new

11alf'are state.

Final.l3•

there

was the

power

and political ideology

pcl.ari.mations between the COJnlll.ist and the non-communist

camps

requirement for the

countries on

u.s. to

buttress-up the non-communist

12Sarauel. Krislov and

IJ.oyd Musolf, The Pollties 0£
l.

and the

global basie.

(Bostons

Houghton Hifflin Co., 1964), P•

Regulation
'

a

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

II.

Nature of the

'nle
The
events

in

adJdnistratift procen
;ing out

carr

making1 rule

executift am

poll8'f8

group of persons

of those

in order

th11

government,

related acts

when vi..ad

our

adjudicat.ion. With
it becomes

powers

1n

a

necessary

single

and
rule

as

Constitution providing

and shared powers a.>ng

judicial branches,

limited delegations

essent1ally

the tunct1ons of

application and

for both separation ot

18

Procesa

the legislative,
tie>

bring to gether

person or

to enable the government to

in

act

an

organized

through that

person

or group. The delegation of powers is ordinarily made by Congresa

to

head

the

agency may

or a

(or heads) of

be defined ae

legislative

an administrative a gency.

mv

An administrative

governmental authority other

body which haa the power to affect

the

partd.es through either rulo-maldng or adj udication ar
administrative

the

agenciee (uaua�

executive branch or

our

govenl!tental. authoriV is

authority,
congress

an

may

government.

called a n

rights

both.

select for

It doea

tends to

administrator).

of

private

Therefore

o£

not matter ·whether a

office, a ocazd.seion, a

it; if it has rule-tnaking

Congress

court

federal agencies) are a part

administration, a department, a burea u, or

1 t is an ag«lcy.
agent (ohiet

temed

than a

look upon the

board, an

111fY

other

or adjudicatory
President

as

rune

.tunctions,

its chief

He also has rule-making powers (executive

orders) am adjudicatory powers (the pardorting power).

16

17
Clo•1Y as lJOCiated lid.th the operations

grcv1ng bodT

a fast

of a6ninistrative law.

of

administrative agencies is

.Adm1.n1strative

law may

be

defined as the lav ooneern1ng the powers and procedures of tederal agencies,
including eapeoiaJ.l1' the law governing judicial review of administrative
This ]Aw CONdalte of constitutional

action.
law and

�,.

delegation of
review of

made law.

power

tvo

statute law, common

The bulk of administrative law relates to the

t.e agencies, tho exercise of power by agencies and the

adminil!Jtrat.tft actions by the courts.

to focua on rule..,.lking � •djudication
those

J.sw,

1
f'unctions•

and

Emphasis at present tends

powers closely related to

.AJiaong the ack of our First Congress wae one to do oanething tor the
soldiers Who had bfftl disabled during

tb.e Revolution. On September 29,

1789, CongTeas passed a law providing fo r the payment of pensions to
"invalids

who

were

vouMed or disabled during the late war" to be paid

"under such regul.ationa

as

the President ot the United States

Of course the Preaident could not do the job himself.

He

may

direct.n

2

set up an

administrative agency to formulate the r egulat ions (rules) governing
eligibility for pensions and to d•termine the v-alidity of' (adjudicate) the
claims which

V9l'e

expected

to be f"orthoomi.ng.

Since that td.me Congrese has

continuously' produced legislation which had to be implenented through
federal agencies, utilizing the administrative process.

The pattern set

-

�enneth

Culp Dav.is, Administrative

West Publlabing Co.,

2

�.,,

P• 8 .

1959),

PP•

tlf2.

Law � (St.

Paul.:

18

by the establishment of the predecessor agency to our present
Adainist.ration has

been

fol.l.ond

since

ever

by congress to establish nil.._
As administrative

making, rule applying and adjudicating agencies.
problale

have become more C0111pl.ex, CongJ'ess has

l:i.11its or delegated powers
usea in a more precise

more

manner

aought.

c:loeely am to set
done

than was

Veterans

to

define the

the stcr3.ards for th.U

in 1769.

Congresa has al.ao

tented to define organiza�nal matters, operational. matt.era and

jurisdictional matters in a

re precise

mo

pursuant to its acts 1n later J&at'S•

manner

answer

&et

up

The lilhole philosophy of using

agmcies and the administrative process is to

to find practical

for th e ageneiea

UM

praetioal mm (appointed)

s to problana Which should be aolved

in

an

efficient

and eftecti'f'e manner without unnecessary del..81•
Reasons
The principal

for IJse

reason f'or both

the number of f edera1

the increase in

agencies and in the increasing use of the administrative

process is the

direct result of our change of concept !ran l.i.raited govornilent to government
with inherent

powers

to deal

with

otha:ndse

be dealt

reasons.

l"irst, except in

with any and

expeditiously

mctromel.y

all problms which cannot

and adequately.

limited areas, Congress has never bean

a position to legisl.ate in the detail raquired to eliminate the need for

in
the

use

0£ discret.1.on

by the

men

who will be charged wi th i ts implanentation•

.Also, there are certain advantages for Ciongrees
in

There are additional

being able

avoids

to turn

and

iIXli.ViduaJ. congressmen

difficult problems over to federal agencies.

undue criticism

and pressure

on

it enable.a congressmen to do valuable

congressmen and
"case

work•

on

It

Congress itselt,

and

the problem for their

19
con sti tuent.s by intercecling for

them with the agencies.

always been a need to bi"ing the

federal government cl.oser to the people to

obtain needed .f'aots and infomation for legislation
the operation of the

Second, there has

by Congress and for

agenci es, as wl1 as to change the image of the federal

government from one that is far away from and high above the
to

one

which has represent4ltives close at hand.

nature of bureaucratic operations by most federal
"out in

the field" i n elose competition with the

am loc al governments for popular attention.
process is the most .efficient in the

to accomplish the er:ds

use

which a re sought.

'Jhe

common people

present decentralized

a gencies puts bureaucrats
representatives

of state

Third, the administrative

of time,,

men,

money and materials

It is efficient precisely

because an agency gi� cognizance over a partieula·r policy or function
is also delegated

suttic:tent

controversies which

can

with

the vast

be reasonably expected to arise.

.for a limited !unction of
itself in the

powers to deal

a specific

aj o rity o:f the

m

Given

responsibility

nature, the agency can organize

:most efficient manner, the requisite numbers and typ es of

specialists and generalist.s

can

be assanbled• proper divisions

o.f effort

can be made• coo.peratio-n and coordination can be achieved and something
appro aching assembl.y·line methods can be adapted to accomplish all related
tes.lcs in the most rational manner.
administration is

best illustrated by t."1e use of the administrative process

to define the problems,
them.

What science there is in public

to devise

me thod

s for t.heir s oluti on

and

to solve

Finally# the axperi�e and expertise resulting .from past a.nd current

operations can be plowed back into the system to improve and re.tine :future
operations' in the same al'ea in an on-going dynamic fashion.

20

Chief Criticiems
The increased use of the administrative process has not been without

its critics.

The criticians center aroum two major contentions.

first is the objection of 8Qme

to

being subjected to rules made by

vbo are not legislators and to adjudicatioms made by men vho
judges.

are

men

not

That those men might be lawyers as well as bureauCl"ats doee nDt
These objectors might be termed the nruJ..e by law"

lessen the objectJ.on.
men

The

who dulre that what administrators

in detail in statute law

90

are allovec:l to do be spelled out

that aivone (if he happens to be a lawyer)

might htn9 a good understanding ot ju.st What he

could

or could not do

o£ their objection

without haring to be told by a bureaucrat.

The

is the degree of diecretion usually allowd

to admin1etrat.ors1

rule-mald.ng

and rule adjudication.

crux

both as t.o

This complaint has subsided somewhat

over the years, but in the l930's it was rampant.

Professor Davi.a has

caught the essence of this complaint and the reasms £or it in a partioulal3
illuminating article.3
'fhe other maj or contention is that some agencies,
the independent regulatory commissions, are
Concerning the agenal.u
contention is • lack of

noainally
central

airnp1y not

and

particularly

doing the j.ob.

under the oontirol of the President, the

organization, direction

and

control.

to

avoid duplication of eff'ort,. work at cross purposes and other deficiencies
eusceptibl.e

to

oerr-ectio n by gi'Ving more power to the President to

reorganize the whole

\:enneth Culp

executive

branch bureaucracy and to prov.i.de gllidance

Davis, 11Reaaon.s for Opposition to the Administrative
Process" in The Polit
ics
at;:ton, ed. by Samuel Krlslov and Uoyd
Musolf (Bostons lJOugn
tOn, H
· n Co.1 1964 ), PP• 4 7-SJ..

��
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tor

all

units.

Every study of

ad'VOCated more power to tJle

the

eDCutive

branch ot

our go�t has

President to any out the duties which

constantly piled upon h1Ja.4 There must be a good

lula not been given the recommended powers,

NaSOn

why the

President; to rearrange the bureaucracies, vhioh it cnated

the most

Preeident

and there is one-politics.

Congresa has only' � given t11all incranents ot paw.-

its own for

Re

to

the

and considers

pet.

There m-e two specllications to the charge against the regulatory
agencies that they Q'e not doing the job.
even nominal contl"ol by

in a

the President and Congress has set them adr1£t

poli�ical sea 111.thou\ adequate navigational aids.

adequate guidanoe
they

First., they sre not subject to

have

troa Congress and

a

Second, th.t without

sense � direction .from t.he Prea:ident,

been "captured" by the ver.r interest that they were sent out

to regulate.

regulatory

Professor Bernstein has

described the position of the

1tgenc1es am their major problma .-1.d £allure$ in

criticisn before a comMittee of Congreaa.
that the comdssions

(or the

interests which arc

powerful polltical.ly.

Here again the main reason

are not doing the job is politics.

interests like the arranganents just
interests

>

a constructive

a s they are,

and

The regulated

the

regulated

suppoeed to be regulated ) are

Richard O�.f, President Cleveland ' s Attorney General,

4See especially the President•s Committee on Administrative
ial Studies (Washington, n . c . s u.s. Government
with
Printing Off ce• 19,7)�
C
ornm!sS!O
n on Organization or the Executi-,.
Taek !!m
(Washington1
Branch or GoV91"11Dent1 � �th

nanagemen t t
n.c . 1

u.s.

Repotts ) .

t;:rt

!9 9),

�arvar Bernate� "The
PP•

mcp.al

�

Government�
--Of�
ee. !94'"'8n<rl955:over

,ul.ato;rz A�enciea,

R

!d

�:::0.0

ed.

Commission

Comnisaioms Have Failed, • in � :J:�
ep
�

by Leon Salomon (New

York1

The

H.�

22
marked out th9 ow '-· ._ ngulated interests, when he wrote to the
president ot • . � ..., had aome res ervat.iqna abo&lt regulation by the
New Intern.•

in 1892•

Ct9{111•

Mr. Olney' statAd in his letter baek

CJ1 1l•ion.

• • • �' Qc'
-'•ll• • • . is, GJ' can be m•de of great use
to the r� It aeUstied popular clamor fc;yr
IO'f'•••t. � � %'ailroacle, et "118 ame t.ima
the � b entirely nominal. Furthei-, the older
_

• "
'° bet ta.
m
;I
. •re it w1ll be tourd to
t8k• th
e bu!Ma and
view ot things. It thu.s
bee•• a .... et Nn1er between the
and h � ll1d • 90l't of protection agairurt hasty
em _... 1.....,.t&on heetU.. to
intel'eata. • •
'ft'l9 pU't o� vt.tm is no t to destroy the eonn1ssion but
"° •\flt• "-0

.......

rail.Nad

Attome1 0..-lt'l OlMy

was

railroad corporations
railroad
•

stating an opinion of the Nell Interstate

Commeree � tbd eubeequent experience haa largel.;r confirmed as a
£8a'b. 1
Place in Our Government
It ....

� saf'e to

say that the adi:ainistretiw process

the bu:NaUONtlo �el qenciea are

with wt to

at.ay.

With the

and

pluralistic

polltieal NltuN ot OU" 80Ciety the process see.m s to offer the best

opportumty

fbr their interplay and the achievement of reasonably effective

progrme and poliai.ee over the years.
biased in

f'nor ot those interest.

and will.1ng tie pwJt1

their

'i:ttchard Olne71

O! course the process tends

to be

�ups Which are organized and capable

int e rests,

but one

lld.ght also observe that

quoted in Davis, Admini8&rat1ve

!:,!! Te�,

P•

7.

7Sauel P• Huntington, "The Maramus of the ICCi The Commission,
Railroads and the Public Interest" in Public Adnr...nistration and
Polley, ed. by Peter Woll (New Yorks Harper 'aiit G, D
b6j1 p: W.

the

politics

i.s also the

organization

of bias

(values).

Such

protection as

adrti.n:!.strati ve process is

the public interest receivos in t•1e

largely

dependent upon the good j•ldgtt1ent of t,,h e appointed officials and

men

vho must

run the

arcneie:s in a po1.i.tieally

Senator Robert A. ':.'art, whom
proponent ot

big �.

Helatione Aot ot

l9lS

accountabl.o tor tbelr

no one

nevarthel.ens

to make

labor
8

2)

top

career

charged c..'W'i....roment.

would have accused of being a

helped

amend the Hational Labor

urdone amenable to the laW ant1

•ettons.

A nUllber ot ].ea.ding politicians aT¥i "Public o£f'ic1w, Repu.blioans

and Dnocrata al:fke1 aa well a a scholars, have expressod their general
appl"Obatdon of adalniatrat1ve aceneiea and tho adninL�ative process.

Attorney o.n.r.i Herbert Brownell gq>.reseed the general sentiment on the
subject in

19SS

when he wrote•

Adalinistratift agencies have becwme a part c4 our
constitutional covemment, accepted by Congress, the
judiciary am the people as an ea8GJ\t1.al part ot our
go�ent otructure. They were C?"oated as a necessary
mHJl8 £or 1U"'Otecting public in�sts vhich could not
be 11Uitably !)rotooted by the eourtn or othOl' means.
Adndnist.ratiw agenciee must be pel'laitted to ft,nction
ef'£'1cient� and eff'ect:tvely 1f' the ,ublie intaNst,9
Vhioh is t.� primary concern, is to be preael"98d.

It

ean

reasonab1y bo expected that we will see

toderal

•1 01.

0

�•

agenciea.

8
Labot }�

xdTJC,

.�e.

9nerbert

PP• lB-19.

r.10re

rather then frJWflr

.. �ati®S Act ('l"8.£.� Hartley Act)

1

nt

aJ ( 2).

us

924!,

Brownell, quot.00 1n :1av:ls,, Administrati,ve !-!!Tro.."t,

FIIDERAL AGENCY OPERATIONS

III.

General
Organization
Agencies have been

brought

tor government to enter into a
either old or nw problems.

le

exattp

of

the creation

societ1 itself'.

into being whe'l there has been a need

new

area or

our

society to deal with

The Social Security Adnrl.n:istration is an

of an agency to deal with a problem

The Federal Conrnunieaticms C0111T1ission is

ot an agency brought into being to deal
advanoing technolGgy.

The agencies

are

as

an

old as

example

vith one of the problems ot

usually c�eated

by

Congress

at

the t1me a particular act is passed requiring the use of the administrative

prooeas tor its implementation.
or nat.1.onal. emergency. almost

At other time s, under the press of war

blanket authority

President to create agencies by executi'Ye order

!err

carry out functions

them has ceased or their functions haw been transterred to

other ag'8ncies or
fumtions.

to

been £9.ven to the

Old agencies have been abolished when

essential to the national eff'ort.1
the need

has

new

agencies have

absorbed old

agencie s as well as their

Several of our present executive departlnents began as agencies

or ofi"ices and were later raised to departmental level.
Justice is an

(l9hl) .

lsee

early example. Same

First War

Power.,

The Depal'bnent or

departments, when they

Act, Statutes � LaIJe,, LV,

were

sec.

formed,
838
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have

incorporated one or more agencies already in existence into their

O?'ganinations.

The Department of Health

Education and Welfare

le or such incorporation of existing agencies.

is an

axamp

The question of just

which

units of organization are agencies and which are not is not an easy

one to answer.

If

a unit ( bureau, office, administration, etc . ) makes rules

to implement legislation or it ha s

the

power to adjudicate controversies

arising under the application of rule s , it is an agency.
follow that

s001e of the larger agencie s are canposed

agencies, and

has nine

indeed that is true.

ajor units, each under

m

For

an

�

It

would then

macy smaller

example, the Department of

assistant secretary.

HEW

One of those

units is the Social Security Administration, forrnel"ly an independent agency
created to ir.iplcment the Social Security Act of 1935.

units, one of which is the Bureau
Insur ance.

or

It

now

has t'our

sub-

Old Age Assistance and Survi"VOr

That bureau maintains millions of records and handles m1.ll1ona

of claims each year.

2

Staffing

'nle f'ederal agencies are
appointees
oan

make

ap

starred

and the cm-eer service.

�m tvo main sources- political.

'nle President and his

major appointees

to about 1200 political appoint.menUI to positions invo.lftd in

policy making.

Thia does not mean th at all of these appointments

are

made

at each change of administration, but it does mean that the President can
fill

sensitive political spo'ts in the various agencies and offices with his

own men, or men who share his political. outlook and values .
510CX>

Approximately

"super grade" career personnel with long experience or high

2icenneth Culp Dav.ts, Administrative Lav Text ( st. Paul:
Publishing eo . , 1959) , P• 4 .

West

protesaional qualifications (most usually

both)

man

staff sectiona and elsewhere in the agencies, where

am profeslional qualifications are at a pradum.

a particul.arly suitable assigment

by

the top posts in bureaus,

experience, expertise
Bureau chie.t is considered

such men.3

Delegations of Power
Delegations of power to make rules and to adjudicate controversies
are made to agencies by Congress in connection with the particular act
requiring administration.

The National Labor Relations Act produced the

National Labor Relations Board for example.

The original objections to

the <lelegation o.r powers, as such, have all but disappeared.

The controlling

thoueht today in our courts is that Congress must set reasonable limits
such delegations and set reasonable standards for their uses.

The

to

Supreme

Court has never found a delegation of power by Congress to a l'egularl.y
constituted administrative agency invelid.

4

This has not been tl"\18 o£

delegations of power to the President in tvo instances during the New Deal.
Congress is seldom able to enact other than broad general policy
Which requires "filling in the details" by an agency or the President.
There is more than one advantage to that procedllro.

or course it

saves

time and effort required to legislate in more detail; but perhaps more
important, it avoids the necessity to nueter majorities on controversial

)John J. ·)arson and R. Shale Pa�, !l!!l
The Brookings T. stitution, 1967), PP• 1;.-S.

4see Davis,

Administrative

1!! Text,

Ji!!!: � !2E_

P•

(Wash., D.C.1

32.

S
Sae Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 u.s. 388 ( 1935) and
In each case
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. u . s ., 295' u.s. 495 (1935) .
Congress failed to set any limits to the delegation of power to the
President or to prescribe adequate standards for its use.

S
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details which tend to put congressmen in embarrassing positions with

home•

people back

Aleo

there is political capital to be made during the

ilnplementatJ.on of the policy
lost by commitment

to

the

by

an

agency, which might well have been

more datails original.l.y.

In this roapeot the

federal agencies could be vie-wed as agonts of congress

to

resolve

6

oonfllcts among interest groups as well as agents to put law into effeot.

Principal Operations
operations ot all agencies fill under the three general

The
headings

of

rule-making, rule application mci adjwiication, each

involves polltics in administration.

The
some

tt>om

c

of which

pro edures for rule-r.1aking by a�encioa vaey widely, but

for outside participation.

all leave

The procedure to bo followed is

left largely up to the discretion and the political sense o£ the agency
head, or heads in the case of

commissions

and boards.

1nvo1ves consultation with the parties to be affected.

UsualJJr rule-.imaking
The consultation may

take place in the form of a conference, requests for written presentations,
open hearings, arguroent he:irings and even trial type hearings, depending
upon the nature of tho subject matter tor which rule making i s required.
After tentative rules are

made provi8ions exist for publication and

deterred dates of effectiveness to permit petitions

£or changes.

addition to the agency's efforts to be fair aI¥l realistic

In

in establishing

rules, cognizant cocnnittees of Congres s often like to review the proposed

and the Public Interest
6E. Pendleton Herring, Public Administration HcGraw Pill Book Co., gJ
5), PP• 6:§.

(New York:
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rules tor aJY political implications as well as to cheek on the agency's

ability

to interpret the "will of Congress."

In many

cases tJi.e opinion of

the Attorney General may be requested on proposed rules as to legality
or

oth er matters.

in a

It ia sufficient to ••Y that rul.8-aald.ng 18 legislation

na..
"TOw sense and for

a pert:!.eular purpose 1 authorized by

Congress Vith

representation of all interests fully allowed. 1
Rule Application
J'.19[!,islation by Congress iS best achieved by making basic policy

and laws relating t,o categories

broad political, economic

o! things

and classes ot persons tor

or social objeatiws.

The

main functions of

agencies is to apply general policy or law to particular cases.

8"1eraee citimen is not intei-ested

so

much in vhat an act of Congress MY8

as he is in how it might apply to him, personally'.

Of course he has vague

ideas (or re us) ot how it might applJJ but al'ter the rules
has a much better idea.

It the

the majority of the people
principal objective

in

r ule s

will obey

'lh.e

can be made

made, he

cl.ear and understandable

them by habit.

rule appllc•t1on.

are

Compliance is

Self entorci.ng type rulas are

favored, if the matter being administered vill permit such rules.

seldcm does,

and supervision

id required to

SlJ!>&rvision serves two purposes.

the

ensure

compliance.

It

The

First, it G11Courages compliance; amt

nd, it may disclose any shortcomings or inequities in the rules,

eeoo

t;hmeel"fttm.

In the course ot euperviaion, it may also be necessary to

7see Davis, Administrative � Text, Chapter

6.

give advisory opinions and to issue declaratory orders to let people

knm1

where t.hey stand in relation to tho law, including what the'IJ oan or

e

do and still be safel.y Within th

cannot

the people

into

compliance

law.

The

whole

rather than to torce them.

id.ea is to lead

8

Adjudication
Despite the care 'With which a({encies make and apply rules, questions

will arise

both as to the applicability or the rules and the fairness ot

decisions made under them in particular cases.

The power

to adjudicate

controversies arising from either source is usually included in grants of
power to agencies, especially to the

not

power

judicate

to ad

is specifically granted,. it is u sually assumed to

have been made short of the power
involved

j udicating

in ad

\1f11ether or

regulatory agencies.

to

impose sanctions, and

to some degree, at least in the informal

Like ru.le-aald.ng, adjudicating is of special interest

to

private rights.

very carei"Ully

all.

•

Consequently,

in this area to avoid Violation of any

exanination

of evidence and others are oare1'UllJr

This is not to sug�est that a court room atmosphere prevaUe at

In practice such adjudications

oonterenoe-like
nost.

are

uaual.ly made quite 1.ntormfll.]3 in

a1imosphere, Where everyone

exclusion of what he has to say.
course

as

The procedural sateguaro. of notice, hearing, right to

coanael., crosa exanination,
obsened.

are

manner.

the courta,

wll as to the parties wbich may be involved or affected.

the agencies operate

all agenci..

can

be heard with no

Settlement by mutual consent is

favored by agencies, courts and the parties involved.

8see Davis, Administrative � Text, Chapter

4.

the

It it beooaee neeesury to conduct

aide is expeoted to appeal
great

care

on pointa of

is taklen to ensure

that

·•

tomal hemng trc. vtd.ch om
equity

law,

the record is

cmpl.ete and

presentations of briefs, oral arguments, tfftimol\V'
which may poaaihly be relevant.

this
can

is

the exoep\ion rather

arxi

reuone,

includes all

all other

matter

Some cases do etKl up in the courts, but

than

handle all but a ftJW cases

or for other

The rule ia thn •genci•

the rule..

out � the 8"8t vo.l.ume

of

cases

requiring

ad.jQdication.9

acne

Political

Operations

Building Support
All federal agencies have considerable support .trem the inst.ituUon
which

created

them-Congress.

the Supreme Court and

have

not

usually

their jobs.
exercising

Likewise they have

important segments of

been overly

support from the

the population.

President,

Presidents

eritieal o f the agencies for the way they

The Supreme Court has usual.ly supported agency operations by

self-restraint in

constitutional

boundaries

crossed. However, thia

reference

to their operations, so long

and botmdaries to personal

is seldom enough.

as

rights have not

Unlesa agencies

can

been

win general

pUbllc approval. and specific approval b"om t.he groupa with which t.hey'
primarily, the feedbaok tr<:n their operations
aJ¥l

the courts

reaching Ccmgreaa, the

deal,

Pres:i.dent

tends to undermine the institutional support. � were

original.l.Y given.
is

do

Perhaps the most :import.ant tuk for

political executives

to aaintain and build up instittttional su� by gaining popular

1963) 1

9See Peter Woll• �r19!!1 Bureaucracz
Chapter ).

(New

Yo:rica

w.w. Norton Co.,

support £':rorn �ortant

segments ot

!he FBI, rcrr ex8Dple, 18

the pUbllc .

J. F.dgar Hoover has headed the FBI longer thm

an institution itself.

most Americans can remenaber.

He has � w.ner eight presidtmts.

Since the goverll'l19nt bears

upon the

citi.zens

through

the agenciee

Which are manned at the higher levels by bureaucrats, the v1nn1ng of
popular support ia moet important.

Kl.ected otticers have constituents,

Congress and the Presl.dent like t,o reintorce

and so do the agencies.

success by gi"f'ing more support to agencies which

are

doing

• good job and

The political operations should be conducted

have public support also.

by the agency heads to be the most ef'tectift.

Ns does not mean

partisan politics, but the politics of getting

along

and out of govert1V1ent
are

concerned.

professional.

vho

count

insofar

with the people in

as the agency' s principal operations

Since mo:rt. political encutives

are mv

chosen fctr

competence rat.her than political. experience, the eareer

bureaucrats who know all the pitfalls along the political

trails

can be

most helpful with timely advice conoerning who to ""• when an:l for what.10
Resolving

Connicts

The sources ot contlicts tor agencies are lftC\Y•
i s boum

First of all there

to be a certain tm0unt of connict within the agency 1tsel.t•

despite the beet eftorte to control it.
exec uti- is to get his
not much else can be

9Clletim&e tail

mm

done.

tho f'!rst task for the political.

houee (age�) in oni.z..

Not

tJnl.ess this is done,

only •eency heads but cabinet members

in this important effort.

The recent change o! secretaries

z1 P tics arxi Public; Policz
10Franc1s E. Rourke, Bure!ucr1o
9
6
9
), pp
;1!:95.Little, Brown am &. ,1'.

(Boeton1

�

of

Ii»/

seems to illustrate this Point.11 The reaol.utrion of confllcts

arising

an agency' s operations are to be expected.

in cormecti.on with

can usually

be

reaolved to the satisf'acti.on of all

political capital.

can

be made simply from doing the job well.

among an agency's clian't;s and frequent appeals
do

nothing to add to the political capital of

Finally, there are conflicts aoong agencies
boundaries.
and

paiot:f.ea concerned

and

�

Diasatis:taetion

reeorta to oourt actions

en agenoy or

aver

4lhey

its head.

jurisdictions and

Congress has not aJ.wqe been care!ul to prtmmt ovarlapa

duplications.

These conflicts take two forms.

One fol"m has

been

called "bureaucratic imperialism" after the attempts of a>me agencias to
take over

some of the functions

more common, might be called

of other agencies.12

The other form, much

"diffused responsibility."

It is well

illustrated by the fact that no less than aeventeen other agenciaa

besid&s

HEW

Resolution

have sane responsibility

of conflicts

in

in the field o£ educatian.1'

either of these areas requires a high degree

or polltical skill to survive and to do the job wn.
Pr<Doting Legithlacy
A&e?lGY ope.rations do have some effect

of the federal government.

PP•

on

promoting the l.egitdmacy

The outll'ilt& of goverment, for the IQOst par1;,

ll,..F:inch steps Down-To the White House. tt

24-2$.

l2t�hev J.
Science

J!!5••

LX

Holden, "lliperialism in Bureaucraey1"

(Dec. 1966) 943-51.
1

l)Richa?'d BoJ11ng,

Co., Inc., 1968),

Nev.fl!!.!!!!. June 15• 1970,

P•

263.

PO!!!£ � th! f!ogae (Nw

York•

.Ame:rie411 PoUtisA

E.P. Dutton and

33

.tlov thr®gh agencies; and the wey the agencies handle their jobs aid the

peopl., with whom they deal.1 more or less d:ireotJ.y, can ha-ve a

effect upon whether or not those people
meeting their needs.

eee

the goverment as

decided
one

Whioh 18

Of course suoceesful operations help to create a

legitimacy for· the agencies, themselves.

Since the a<mtnt. of

TV

politics,

it ia not uncommon at all tor the people to eee and hear important
bureaucrats discuss

some

of the aspects and problans of their

further a .tavnrable image ot their particular agenciee.

work to

Conmd.aaionezo

The

of Internal Re'V9nue has used the fil'st page of the i.ncome tax instructj.ona
to

explain the task that his

agency faces and to enlist

of all taxpayers in order to do the

job

the cooperation

well.lk

Legislative Proposal.9

The first harxl aperience g&i.ned frQQ the irllplenaemation o.t

legial.a1d.on often leads the agenoi.es to suggest legisl.Rive changes to

clar1l7 t.he law or to •end it to blreaden 1ta
entirel.7 new proposal.a mq be. o.ti'ered.

t4ce the moat ".fr.ienil¥"

route.15

aco�.

In some casea

Such proposals are most lik&l¥ to

U Congre88 or the particular committees

hariJlg cognizmce over the agwy ea particularly impNs8ed

agency's operations or the

might

well originate in

progret

Congress.

with

the

being adairdatered.1 the legislation
In other

cases, it could

the execut.iw branch ae part o� the President' s program.

originate in

and

in certain

lASheldon s. Cohen, "A PerBODll 1-tter trom the Conauisai.oner ot
Internal Revenue�" Fed.ral InCOt.r18 Tax Fo1'DlS � 1967 (Wash., D.c.s
u.s. Treasury Depariiiiilt, InternallteVenue sern.ce;:i.?67), P• l.

l5See J. Leiper Freeman,, The PoUtical Processa Executive Burea�
Legislat.1.ve Comnittee Relationa.�v. ea. U1ew forka Random House, 1965),

cil
apter L'..

cases it might originate in the

aeency itsel.f'.

a most important part in the initiatio'l of
under

its

cogni z mce.
�

In

soTlle cases bills

account of sueh a bill sponsored by the
1964) .

Even though tho bill

considerable

time

to

have

matters

William I,. Cary gives

a

good

chairmanship (1961-

ntrovor sial., it took

oon-co

The bill was the

Secu�ities

(P.L. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 31642, August 20,

While there was

support for it

considered

covering

1leen oricinate<l by asencies

S� during his

eet it through CoJ'l8reS$•

Aet Amendment of 1964

1964 ) .

was

lf3t,."'islation

any

and s;x>nsored through Congress by the agency.

agency plays

In any case the

no

real oppooition

to

there

it,

either.16

was

no

great

Political A8pecta of Operat.ions

This discussion of tederal agency operations has been
indione the political

nature

of all auch operations, including operations

vitidn the agenci.es themaelwa.

(benetiu)

and

presented to

Agencies are the

disadvantage• (oosta) to people.

distributors of advant.gea

Much of how this is to be

done ie decided politicall.7, f'int at the highest l.evel and

then at the

agenq l.8'991 . cne could "1• the level of congressional canmittee-agency
interest group as 11conpartmmtal.111ed" democracy, except that not all

significant groups in
their intcmsts into

poor,

Al'lerica are organized interest groups,

the

political al"9nB and protect them.

which oan

push

The black, the

the ,oung end the old are exantpl.es ot sign1.f1.cant groups which do not

enjoy the same access as do soote of the more arnuent, organized and

articulate groups.
the

center

of the political arena and subject.ad to political pressures tran

all sides at

York i

Nevertheless it i s fair to s1zy that the agencies are in

all times.

l.65ee William L. Cary, Politics am fue Regulato!7
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), Ch apter'""'!;;

.Agencies (New

BURF.AUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY

IV•

Democratic Contributions
As

Madison said

in

F•ral.16't

!1§, our form of govez'2ll!Mmt 1e

representative republic (eorustitutional democracy)
eh9cka and balances and separated

v.i.th • vstan 0£
According

and 5hared powere.

nomative concepts, such a govermant

shoul<i be

to our

representative,

responsible and accountable for its actions to the people. Yet
are

all veil aware

with

or

�t

the per sons who obviously

the carrying out of g0'99nmMmt funetiona

emreer

08

politica1 awointees

people. At best they are only indirectly

aocountable

the bureauerata,, political and career .Uke, help to
ative

requirement for

This is true

manner.

not

a

t.itution-1 democracy

cons

we

have the most to do

people through the elected official.a. Nnvthelaae. it

norm

e

is

suggested that

f'ul.f'ill
in

a

only because bureaucrats share

but also because the great majority ot the people with

to the

the

most sati efactory
thoee

whom

concepts,

they deal

also share then and expect the go"Yertnent to behave accordingly. Paul
Appleby

summed

it up

well when

he said,

u.An

inditsenous

bureaucracy is

mmv' delicate and important ways a reneetion of its societq• ..1

Representation
Representation involves
demands known.

An

access to

goverment to make needs and

individual or a group which does not have access to

1i>aul Appleby* Policy and Adnd.nistrati,on (Tuscaloosa,
UniVf..>rsity of Alabama Press, m11. P • �1.
35

Ala. i

in

aovel'l111Slt through

some element of our

be rep1'8eented to arq marked degree .

political syatan

i8 mt likely to

There are 11181\Y paths or aeceSBs

political. pertioa, elected representatives, the oourte, intereS"t; f:.TOUpa,
pressure groups and "the appropriate bureaucracy-if there happens to be
ona.

The more Tle.ln8

of

access an individual or group

has the

111)?'8

likaly that one or oore of them Will be able to represent their interests.
The new departllant.8 of Hml
individuals am

and HUD have

opened

groups which before lacked

any

�

8'V9lllle S or access

real access.

Congress 18

un:iar the control of the standing co::nitt&ea and particularly the

chairmen of such

cor.md.tteea.

repreeantative of national
and parochial interests.

Consequently Congress haB not bean

interests

as much •s it has beSl ot sectJ.anal

B�aucraciea, which do not. have paroohial.

lean:tngs, are often more representative than Co�ss 1n the national

(publl.c ) into:rest. 2

Thero are two ad:vanta[.'es

of interests through agenc::ies .
is recap-ti'ft and � be able

it the age114y

cannot

to

First the agency

seeking representation

(tor good

public relation8)

to solve the pn>blan on the spot.

solve the problem, although it is

for which it teals responsible, it

can represent

or to the President in a most e.fi'ective

Second,

_,parently

one

the interest to Congress

mannel".

Responsiveness

A bureaucracy having a narrow

range o£ interests and responsibilities.,

compared to Conereaa� co."l'Wittee chaimen, or congrenmen, is likely

to

be more receptive and responeiT• to problems wxler its cognisance.

One

2tlort.on E.

Lonaj •Buiteauoracy

Political Science Rev:lw, XLVI

and

Conatitutd.onaliaa," .Aroeri.can

(Sept. 1952), PP• 608-18.

37
can

well imagine the response that proponents or Negro voting rights in

tJ1e South eoul.d have expected from Southern senators am Congressmen-none.
The s- was true in the case of school desegregation as well as redistricting

by state

lAIUlatun!s.
.

.

Supreme Court and the Deparlment of Justice

The

proV8d much more respomD.va to the needs in eaeh case.

could be clted to indicate tJl8 responsive nature

0£

Many more exanplea

bureaucratic agencies.

llm-MUCl'&cd.n do not necessarily wait. until a

problem

is

poeed to

In the course of agency operatd.ons, intelligence

them to become reeponaive.

is ga1ned � problems which are develDping or

seem

11lcely to d9\'9l.op.

In either 08H th• agency can take action by expanding its operations to

include

new

pnbll•u,,

or

by requesting additional power f\rom Congress to

deal with them. Aside fro;; the ability to forsee problems, agencies also
have the ability to foresee the needs o:f the clients or groups w-lth which they

are dealing and, in

many cases,

to art.-Lculate

r.ianoor than would otherwise be possible.

these needs in

This is especi

benef'it agencies lacking pressure group olientelas.
less

than

the soldier,

likes

'l'he

ally

a

more efi'ective

true for

the

bureaucrat, no

to be in control of the situation

around

him

insofar as that is possible.

Responsiblell9ea
In

the senae of holding a fomal organizational role, charged with

particul.ar duties and entrusted with the power to act. bureaucrats tend
to act most responsibly.

There are a mmber of reasons why this is true.

r�irst, the hierarchical arrangem&nt of bureaucracies and thoir methods of
record keeping make it extrernely difficult to cover up 1rresponsib1e behavior.

Second, both political am

career

bureaucrats have

r.Ldc nd.abehaT1or fOl' their own advantages.

too

much to lose to

The Prttaident can nmove any
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0£ his appointees for gross :misbehavi-0r, forthwith.
remove any career bureaucrats for the

reason.

Neither elected

judges are subjected to ret!training influences to the same

officials

mr

degree

bureaucrats.

as

saite

His appointees can

In theoey am in practice the Pre:rl.dent is responsible

far all of those serving under him in the m:ecutive branch , including of
couroe all met!lbers or the armed .forces J and in turn they a.re accountable

to him and to the officers appointed over them.

The responsibility o£ administrators does not

end with

ti'le

President.3

Most administrators are slt.ialded by several lqers of bureaucr"ac.y b:'om
the direct attention o£ the Preside nt .

by

the

'.nlB

political SXBcu'M.ves appointed

Pros:i.dent to the top posts and their Aare or lass

!'eel the greatest responsibility tiO the President.

personal. appointees

t.fost or the raaaining

adlnin:1strators probably feel a greater sense o£ reaponaibility to Congress
and to their ellenta and constituem;a.

Ageaci.es are alao reepon8il4e to

their stalls and to tbanaelws to formulate rational pl.ans and prooediJrel
and tor carrJ1l1g than in1'b effeat.

to other

They

owe

eome

degrM

ot responaibility

agencies with whi.oh they must cooperate and coordinate their

activlties to achieve their goals.

With responsibilities owed in

so

marw

directions, it would foll.ow that bureaucrats are inelined to behave with a
high degree of

circumspection

and care.

Aocountabilltq

While bureaucraciee and blreauorate

dinctJy,

an

not aocoun1;able 'bo th e

people

they 0e ac.eountabJ.e to the President who in tum is aeoountable

'itiohard Neua� f!re�,J.1,!l PME (New Yorks

Sons, mo.. , l96o), P• 39.

John Wile7 and
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In

to the people.

theoey the

President

is oot responsible for the actions

of those under him, but in political practice he is

often held

this sense bureaucrats, especially t.11o:Je at the highest lewl

In

so .

s,

might

be

coruddered much more accountable to all of the peo�o than any senator
COilflresS!l8n who is elected by a local e.l.ectorate.
bureauorate.

some

profit personally

are allowed to
President;

fran the power entrusted to theln.
but in some eases they have

Usually

been

such pers:>ns

disrdseed
4

extraae eases th91 have served prison t.erma.

that a citizen might have

that

by

Acy

the

id.ea

bureaucrats are not accountable should be

Accountability extends

forgotten.

a few

in high places, have not resisted the temptation t.o

resign,

ani in

course

Of

or

all the wrq down to the lesser bureaucrats

as wen.

Checks am Balances

Agencies der.1-.. all or their powers .trca Congress.
powers with

the

President and the courts only to the mctent that Cangreu

ahees such powera.
ABalOY'

�,. share

Hovevor1 there are

important checks and balAnce8

actions.

on

Rel.atione with the President

The President ia generally a ssmited to be the head of
burea ucracy

The

or the ueeut.ive branch.

agencies (bureaucracies) do

They

were

crcatAd by acts

Lpar
Dat
e&
o:;I9
�J.

•

owe

is

their

of Corlgre88 llhiah

adnti!rl.ster and the reaources

�eaac?t

not

1'11s

with

vhich

the

erre1re

true only in a nordnal sense.

existence to the Presiclant.

almo gave than statutes to

to do eo. Ex:cept tor those

good account ot eablnet level scatldals aee Burl Noggle,
Oil and Polities iri. the l220 i e (New Yorks w.w. Nort<,n ard
-

btu-eancracies directly

under the Pre81dent,

ottice of the President and thoH

eontrel

with

dcni:n&tea.

the

such as those 1n the Executive

mder cabinet

ottioera• Congress shares

Preffi.dent and in most oases congressional influence

Thi• is particularly' true in re� to the regulatory

commissions.

'fhe greateet power

t.lte

President has •.._,,. the bt.n-eauc:sraey

is the po119r to �to com1nce the bure•crK8 that llhat. he wants

tlwlt

to do is really 1ll:ult they shou1d do as the best course tor then in

their

awn

ael.t interest and that

tor • bureauc:rat to

�

and to Wonder vh.t

follewed.

the

The Presidalt

action being

public•'

eare.ful.l7

PNa:l.clent

cm

eontmplatsl

the

It is extr� dang-erous

the President in an obstinate

usually incl:1ned to l:l.8ten VflrY
aay

of

to

what

manner.

He 1e

t.he President has to

might do it h18 advice is not

always .to.roe a careful reconsideration of arq

by a �ucrat,

and

he ean of eo1lfte cut badge\

requests 01" wi.thhold ame.r already appropr1ate4 as diSllPFO"f9d ot deviant
behnior.
political

What the President can do for the top bureaucrats, his appointed

axecuti�,

especially eabinet o.fficers, can do for lesser

bureaucr.ats.
Rel.ation1 'iiith Congft!Sa
Congre88 bo1d11 the real power

theM am it eould, 1.f'

neceasary,

over

the bureaucraoiee.

abol.ie any

one

of th••

rt

created

Moreo"nlr,

Congress .tunii.US the rea�es f• tneiJt operatiom and suppliu the
statntee am chie1' polieie• tor them to adld.ntster.

t-hat

It is not surpr'lsmg

a good ,.rt ot most burea\lel'ata• tj.me is .tocused

ott

congren.1.onal

relat1one.

6

prograns.

Congress sh.area with the agenc1•• the task of administering

Every

Congress with

agency has at least

more

than a casual

not doing in oanyi.ng out the

tHO committees in eaoh house of

interest 1n what

the agency is doing

Those commit-teee

"will 0£ Congress. "

of course, the subject 11atter and appropriations

or

are,

canmittees or each

House.

Between the top career bureauerats and the eomm.tttee chairmen t.here is
often years ot cloee association and understanding
Presidmta 4md p0llti.oal.

cannot be done.

chairmen aJ¥i the chiefs

are around a

ot 1lhat can am \lhat

executives

oome and

go•

but the

they have a common trait

long time.

The last thing a bureaucrat,

1n the ab111t7 to remember favors am fouls.

either politioal 01' c81'8C", wants is to have Congress conduct a
1.nV9atigation into hie conduct of public matters.
not now

'!'hie does not mean that they are not import.ant.

coonon.

mean that the mere thought

desired

Such invest:LgaticrlS an

Ol"

mention of

one

It could

is suttic1ent to produce

th•

reault.a.

The Courts
While the President and Congress
almost daily, the courts cannot

exercise

control owr the agencies

act until a case comes bef'ore them as

appeal from agency actions or sanct.ione.

an

The greatest power the courts

have is the power to invalidate bureaucratic actiona

if they *2Ceeed the

reasonable limits of delegated powers or if th'Jir adjudications lack
due process in either procedure or substance.

While the Supreme Court

has not so far invalidated a delegation of power to a regular agency

6

See

Jonph P.

(Wash., D.C . 1

�

Harris, C

The Brookinp

essional Control of A&lainistration

Iiia-tUtion, i?Gi), rn:i.pt. 15.

created by Congress, it has invalidated delegations of power to
in two cases.

H8'fttrthaless. cases involving rul.a-mald.ng

tom a considerable part of

the total

of appeals and the Supreme Court.
Celll'ts •

written opin:tone

concem

a bureaucrat giving

eoneequence1

cases

and

the President

adjudicatJ.on

col'ldng batore the Circuit courts

Roughly tvent;r percent of the Supreme
administrat:l:99 decisiona. 7

As a

adVieor:r op1n1.on or issuing a

an

declaratory order on which people may act v1th SOft8 assurance has lllOl'e than
just his CMl opinion upon 'Which to

rely.

a eonnderable bod7 ot case

He bas

law oonceming haw the courts might vlw his actions.

Of course it is :ln hie

best interests to be with the courts prev.1.ous holdings on all

might just possibly end up in court.

matters which

The coma are always a good check

on any temency toward arbitrary use of power.

The

fact that courts fawr

settJ.-.ent o! differences in pre-hearing conferences between p31't1.es, bo·th
in court and

am

administrative

resourceful in

procedures, helps

.fiD:ling so1ut.ions without

to

keep bureaucrats reasonable

re&Gt't to the courts.

Bureaucrats do not like to lose court battlaa C'lf more than they like to
be investigat«l by Congress.

minOr

The Administ:rative Procedlll"es Act of

1�1

amendments. has proven to be a very uHtul. guide, both as to matters

of procedure am the protection of the rights of
streases the
encountered

use

of infOl"mal

means

all

parties

concemed.

to arrive at the resolutJ.on

0£

at all stages in the use of the admin1strati� process.

7
For an e:xeellent account ot court-agency relationship see Martin
Court md Administrative Asencies (Mew York: The
Shapiro, The
Presa,

(19L.6 ) .

S{!l'eme

19 )• Ch.apt. i:-

It

differences

Section 5 (b) in particular stresses set1'1.ement by consent. 8

Free

wit.h

8Ad:ad.n1.strative Proced� �' Statutes !!! Large, !..X• Sec. 5 (b)

other Restraining

Innuence•

In ecldition to the institutional checks
other :tnportant considerations which

cauae

One of

the moat 1.mportan't

ot the

carea aenice

the

political

appointees

factors is

as well.

tends t-o

and cuatoa.

1.na.reasing

The ethics

stabilise his

The

ot

oompetenoe

actions

responsibly.

profeaaionalization

proteaaionala

1111e>ng the

prote881.on&l organizaticma

and behavior

actions toward rational.iv.

as well

as

due

To be •90un:i" 1n

seri�.

for responsible action 1• al.waya

adnd.n.18t.ration1

act

intl.uence o£ one' s peers in a profaSSion

view ot one•e peers is • value to be t.ake:i
reputation

balances, there are

bureaucrats to

and th• increaaing nu11ber of

demand a rather high standard ot

reepect for ln

and

an

asset.

A.

the

pro.teas:ional

In

public

prote•ional.11111 connotes predictability, and predictable

are the vuy toundationa ot bureauoratic

organizations a!¥!

operatiOllS. 9
Outside critics of bureaucratic operationa
purpose also.

the

possible

10

serve

I110st useful

They not onl.Y alert the bureaucrats and the

consequences

Persons

in

some f'1elda have made a career

out or tolloving govennent operations and offering

as well as

people to

o! certain courses, but they also often have

helpful suggestions to ofter.

c.rit.icisms,

a

alternate courses and

leamed Cld

ditterent

const.ructive

The

objectJ..ves.

universities seem to have contributed the m•jority of such persons, but
the professiorus are not far behind.

Some of

these critics

9See Victor Thompson, Bureaucracz and Innovation

Univeraity o! .Alabama Press,

!§�J1

PP•

�5.

have

(Tuscaloosa,

l
Osee W1lter Oellho-rn, When Americana £o!!l!1-!l ( Cambridge a

Un1versitq Prff•• J.966) , PP• �

served

Ala . 1

Harvard

in go"l9l'IU'Oelt
l and have considerable kno'W.1.edge of tho practical side of
things.

Others are often g1ven a chance to serve by being appointed

as

specialists,. advi sers or political exacu1;1vea.
The media and especially television does a reasonably good job of
keeping the people informed on what the bmoeaucrata are doing or not doing
by either reporting on their actions or intervisw:i.ng them for

�

broadcasts.

Panel discussions or presentattons featuring bu.-reaucrats in the news are
particularl,y useful both to the media and to the bureaucrat.

They provide

the opportunity for leading newsmen to ask leading questions and the
opportunity for the bureaucrat to explain what he is doing or what needs
It eives him the chance to win the support of the people, or

to be da'le.

at least to avoid losing same of the support he already had.

It seems

that the ?li.xon administration is making special efforts to make government
"visible.,.
Appraisal.
Despite all the oritieian of bureaucracy in goverrnent there have
been no workable solutions offered to avoid ol11" deptrldence upon it.

The

principal suggestions o!f'ered to avoid such heavy dependence upon bureaucracy
appear

to be three in number.

First, there is the obvious one ot abolishing

big government and thereby abolishing the need tor a
w.tth it.11

big

bureaucracy along

This is an old bureaucratic trick used by one bureaucrat to

get rid o� another that he does not like.

Few people would bell.eve that

we can turn the clock back to 1800.

Hayek,

�r

an adverse criticism of positive go�rnment see Friedrich A.
Serfdom (Chicagos University of Chicago Press, 1944).

���
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po1itics

A second suggestion is to a�ain try to separate
administration, as U that might
in dealing with values.

somehow

This suggestion

be

and

possible and practicable

vould require Congress to enact

statutes in such detail that any discretion on the part of the administrator
would be unnecessary.

Just how Coneress might find the time, the

infornation, the experience and tho profoss1onalisn to do

so

11alph K. lluitt, who has studied Congress for years and

now,

a

is

is

not clear.

himself,

bureaucrat in HElt/ has sa;;;ely obsel"V'OO. that "1 t is not easy for

system to

Make

national policy. tt12

If it cannot

·i 1ake

a

feudal

broad policy easily1

it might have considerable trouble with policy in detail.

Further, there

has been no real evidence offered that Congress is the least bit interested
in legislating

in

detail other than in a few particular areas.

allied to the original suggestion is the
work

of

one

to have

administrative agencies more closely'.lJ

t..he same faulta as the one to legialate

Congress

However, it

Closely
supervise the

suffers

f?"Om

in detail, but to a lesser degree.

: rost �cholars;hstudents and all the committees and commissions which
have oxmained the executive branch favor giv.1.ng more power to the ?resident
to reorganize tho bureauorac;r and to make it more effective and efficiant.
However, thorc are dangers to giving the President too much control over

the

burellucracy,

both on constitutional and practical groums.

constitution lists the powers of Congress 1n
the bureaucracy under the "comand" of

12Ra4>
h K. Huitt, �o
Harper and Row, 1969), P• 2

�ress1

the

1950).

detail.

To put

President might well deny the

� Decades £!_

Analysis (New York :

•

13see Charles E. Hyneman, air�
.
aU()racz

Harper and Row,

considerable

The

!,!! ! Del!>Ocracz (New Yorkt

l
bsee especially James M. Landis The Administrative Process
,
{ New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938 );-
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Congrees the infomation and help it needs to legislate intelligently and
thus interfere with its proper functioning.

On practical gronnds, whoever

contro1s the bureaucracy really controls the government.

This

was

tt'ue of

our government during World Har II, when for �11 practical purposes

the

President, to whom Congress had given "war powers, tt 1''11 the government
through the bureaucraey.15

That the President. shou1d have the general

authority to coordinate the activities of the bureaucracy toward the
achievement of goal-oriented policies approved by Congrens, few woul.d deny.

Change when it comes will probably favor mo1."e control arrl coordination of
the bureaucracy by the Pre sident in prflct..iee

l"Sther than

1.n theol'IJ and more

or a sense of responsibility on the part of Congress to help shape
national policy as Vi'ell as piecomeal and parocM.a1 pol:teies.
group policies

are

not enough.

Congress is changing

as

We need

more

national policy.

Stephen K. Bailey believes and

we

some

Interest
Perhaps

may yet

see

Concress reassert itsel! in the nat1.ona1 polic-.1 malcing field in wh.'lch

16
tho Pres:!.aent and the bureaucracy are now dominant.
The control of the bureaucrac-.1 is not one
The

:;) aj or

0£

America ' e ma,ior problems.

problem is the p:rcrluction of some goal-oriented national policy

by the utilizatio!l. of the skills, expertise and in.formation now present
in

the

bureaucracies to propose such pol.icy for the c0nsideration of Congress

and the President.

The political control of our armed forces is taken

for granted in Alnerioa, yet milita�; p�l:lcy is proposed by military leaders

lS-sae
1963).
16see
Prass, 1966)
Inc••

the 196o • s .

Peter Woll, American Bureaueracz

PP•

145-49.

(New

Yorks

w.w. Norton Co.,

ess (New York s
St. Martina
Stephen Ke Bailey, The New Co r
for his estimate ofSigni
rical< changes �..n Congress during

�
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and either accepted or rejected by the President

and

could not be true also for the bureaucracy in the
difficult to

understand.

Both the

armed forces

bureaucracies are good rep:resentat.tve

cross

Congress.

executive

and

in

regard

seem

branch is

the executive

sections of

branch

American oociety.

T.f' this fact contributes to our value of civilian control

it wonld

Why this

over the military,

also that it s'1ould contribute to our value of constitutional.ism

to bureaucracy.

V.

SUMMARY

This stuc\y has traced

a

AND CONCLUSIONS

chain of historic events over the past

100 y-ears1 which have transformed our society b-orn a simple agrarian one
requiring onl.v a limited amount of government to an industrialized
urbanized

one

requiring a strong central government with powers to deal

with the maey political, economic and social problems produced by those
changes.

The oost dramatic need for big government cane during the Great

Depression (1929•1939) and the need has remained through World War II and

when

most men were small farmers, business

the Cold War.

n1e time

proprietors

lone prof'essionals seans to be gone f'orover in America.

ar

The interdependence of peopl.e upon each other has increased and the
depandence or a11 the people upon the government is still increasing.

Govermient has become the champion of most of the freedoms we enjoy as
imividuals and of the opportunities for the development or our capabilities
in

our

modern mass-cultural society.
As our nation has developed, government was first drawn into the

economic field to regulate business and lat.er into the social field to
alleviate some of tho disJ..oeation problems caused by the industrial
l'evolution in .America.

To fill this need for governnent to act in a

positive, informed and rational manner, the administrative process was
used to fit broad policy to particular needs as they
on-going process.

were

disclosed in an

The administrative process has been subjected to

48

considerable criticism, but no acceptable alternative baa been

to

propoaed

It does allow mmd.mum partieipaUon by the people Who are

replace it.

affected in •rriTing et acceptable eolutiona to problems and for the
aettl.oment of difterenc• by consent rather than court aet1.ol'l8.

It 1e

well accepted by thoae 1lho have had sane experience vi.th its operation, and
that is a � gnw1ng number of our cit.isens.

Its use has g:iTen

go"f&l'mmt a good insight into the needs tor change as veil as a :measure
of the requirements to effect that change.
The need f� the �t to deal with m--.v and varied problana

has also increased its needs for the eenices of inereasing numbers ot
men am women of all ekills to man the bureau.cracS.es of the numerous

agenciee of goverment.

Wherever the government haa an interest 1n our

80Ciety, it baa uaual.JJr created an agency to deal 111.th that interesbJ am
t.he number ot interest. tend ti<> incre•••

Agenc1ea bring together enough

ot the separated and shared powers, as delegat.1..cma b'm Congrese, to all.aw
than to deal e.ffecti'9'9ly with the implementati.on of both policy an4

statute law.

The outpits ot goTernnent, with few except.iona, are handled

through agencies.

The agencies are manned With t1IO types ot bureaucrata

the appointed political executives and the top grade career

men.

The

politic.i exee\ltd.Tea concentrate on major policy objectives mxl polltical
con3ider.-t.tona.

knoVledge

The top career men provide the experience, ex;pertise and

to devise workable solutions,

to achieve desired results.

to

avoid political pitfalls and

Bureaucratic operations are especially beneticial

for the cont1.nuit;y they provide, the intormat.ion they generate aid the
legitimacy they help to create and to r.laintain for the goftmnent.

'lhe

So

bureaucracies in the administrative agencies of our governnent

make val.uable co�butions to our nonnative

concepts

of constitutional.

The bureaucracies are representative, ra,sponsive and highly

democracy.
re sponsibJ.e.

They are accountab1e to the people through their alected

representatives.

'Jith narrower interests and greater depths of under

abilities, the bureaucracies tend to be more representative

standing and

and reeponaive than individual elective of'fieel's1 or the Congress as •

whole,

in

their given areas of responsibility.

apparent in

the

Checks and balances are

cases ot bur�uerats an:i bureaucracies.

Their multiple

responsibilities to the President, Congres•, the cOUl"ts, groups and the

pllblic interest operate to keep them in touch with polltieal realities.
The bureaucrat• a own a.enee of �hared values with the people and the desire
for the approval ot hia prof'essional azxl occupational peers are st..rong
factors tor responsible conduct and competent performance.

problem is not controlling the bureaucracies but giVing

The real

them some national

goal-oriented policies ancl sufficient coordination of effort to allow
th• to £unction to a

higher degree of their real capacities.

l7ret'!J the re sults or this study it appears that four concl.usions may
be indioated1

(a) That politieally appointed
men do

0£.ticial.s and the top grade career

actually run the machinery o£ �overnment.

in the direction am

However, they run it only

at the speed directed by elect.ed oi'f'icials and the

federal courts.
(b) Bureaucracies a1¥1 bureaucrats do not pose any great threats

our polit ical system.

to

On the contrary they f'ulfill the vital need to

bring the powers o! government to bear directly on the problems eenerated in

our present-day society, which only government

While

no

has

any chance to solve.

provisions erlst in our constitution for bureaucracies,

nevertheless, they have become a part of our constitutional democracy

through precedent, usage �nd custom.

A more coordinated effort frcm the bureaucracies of aJJ. the

(c)

agencies eoeae
person

to be desirable.

The President seems to be the obvious

to coord.'lnate the efforts ot the bureaucracies to acc<:nplil!b policy

goa:Ls agreed upon

by both himself' and tho Congress.

can be ach1fff9d onl;r
ot the

A ueti.ng
agencies

COfl!mOn

(d)

in

The necessary coordination

part through reorganization of

the

executive

brmv;h.

minds between the President and Congress to give the

obj ectives will do much more

to

produce coordinated action.

If there is an equally reliable representative, responsive and

effective eubetitute

has escaped

the

for the bureauc:raciee or the executi...
,
e branch, it

nrl.Jxis of some of the worlds best

politicians and soldiers.

Modern government can

scholars,
no

more

sta tesnen,

operate effectively

without bureaucratic sJcil1s than modern corporations or modern armies.
What management is to business,, public administration is to government
more.

and

r
t...hey must also
Not only must the affairs of government be oanaged,

be managed

within a politica1 environment, when both political responsibility

and political accountability are operative factors.
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